India’s institutional system lacks one key component: That is an adequately independent and empowered office of prosecution ( with power to conduct/supervise investigation) from district/regional level up to the central government level. Current system of prosecution/ investigation is pathetically insufficient since it is heavily influenced by political bosses and is not empowered to allocate resources where needed. A push to create such offices, at least for corruption cases, have gained popular momentum through India Against Corruption’s (IAC) Lokpal movement. However, as seen in 2011 winter session of the parliament, political forces are not fully aligned with the popular movement to realize this critical reform in India’s institutional mechanism.
Politics ultimately empower and influence decision making on behalf of the people of the country. Therefore, it is critically important to correctly read the underlying political dynamics and realities when assessing best methods to influence these political decisions.
Politics ultimately empower and influence decision making on behalf of the people of the country. Therefore, it is critically important to correctly read the underlying political dynamics and realities when assessing best methods to influence these political decisions.
Following is my analysis of the political dynamics involved.
I. Lokpal is detrimental to politicians.
Unfortunately, this obvious notion is quite true concerning many politicians and can be sited as the biggest determent for passing strong Lokpal bill in the parliament. For these many less than honest politicians, passing a strong Lokpal bill is equivalent to shooting themselves in the foot. Although this is a cynical and generalized notion, it unfortunately defines overwhelming political dynamics that have played out against the passage of the Lokpal for the last 43+ years. Survival being the most basic of instincts, why would anyone volunteer to shoot himself in the foot? especially the political class? It is extremely difficult to break this impasse.
I suspect there are some other political dynamics involved here, certainly some that can benefit a way for possible passage of the bill.
II. Can High Commands really benefit from Lokpal?
Fortunately, there is a legitimate political purpose that can be served by a Lokpal type institutional body for the high command (HC) of the leading party in coalition governments ( specifically Congress HC in the current case). Raja’s and Kanimozhi’s 3G scam, that put the government in a delicate political situation and brought the survival of the government into the brink - clearly demonstrated this need. This was a “damned if do, damned if i don’t” type of situation for the HC where initiating effective legal action against the key ally's minister would have brought down the government and not taking action would have subjected Congress to a substantial PR beating over an issue instigated by someone else (the allay). Luckily for the Congress HC, the damage was managed because the government could say to the ally that the court forced its hand and also at the same time proclaim to the public that it is taking strong actions against corrupts. The ally was in a weak enough position to accept this situation and not withdraw support.
In this type of scenarios, that can repeat many times over in the future, the government/HC may appreciate having a Lokpal type institution that it can use to deter uncomfortable decisions ( against allys or own partymen and thus avoid taking responsibility for such actions). This is a necessary tool/mechanism in the era of high command politics. Although this political dynamic supports creation of Lokpal body, it by no means support granting ancillary infrastructure for strong and effective functioning of the institution. This is because the HC’s political interest in having Lokpal is only to have a mechanism to avoid responsibility in making uncomfortable decisions, it does not have sufficient interest in seeing a Lokpal that actually is effective in fighting corruption.
III. Opposition’s and government’s politics and IAC’s role.
Up until the run up to the parliamentary debates in late December, opposition parties were team Anna’s best pals. However during the debates, opposition has squandered their high moral position by disowning Lokayuktha provisions in the bill.
By not wanting strong Lokayukthas in states they govern, opposition is signaling their political interest here is quite shallow. They just want a Central Lokpal to dig up dirt against the parties in power in the Center (to make it easier for them to comeback to power there) and clearly they don’t want the same scenario playing out in the states they govern.
This clarified position from the opposition created a disincentive for Congress HC to bring strong Lokpal since it is perceived that bringing strong Lokpal will amount to yielding to opposition’s tricks and thus detrimental for Congress.
Meanwhile, Congress showed it does not want BJP’s support by introducing minority quota and thus deliberately wanted to prevent any possibility BJP will support this bill. This can be interpreted as a political tactic to prevent BJP from getting credit for passing the Lokpal bill by forcing their hands to vote against it. It appears Congress is convinced that it wont get enough credit if Lokpal is passed and wanted to make sure BJP wont get credit either.
In politics, who get credit and who get blame is critically important.
Although IAC’s movement and its pressure tactics were dramatically successful in raising the profile of Lokapl bill and making it an emotive issue, its success has strangely created critical disincentives for Congress HC. Stated more clearly, Congress HC is facing a real dilemma: that is even if it bite the bullet and passed a strong bill (and took on political heat for it), it will not get any credit for passing the bill since all the credit for the passage will be given to Anna. Unfortunately, this political dynamic is not conducive for passing strong Lokpal and IAC should strategies to reverse this dynamics. Political parties normally would not act on something if it is perceived that their actions will only yield credit to someone else. Therefore, it is critically important for IAC to create plan to convince Congress HC otherwise.
Additionally, it should also be noted that IAC’s pressure tactics were also creating disincentives for the opposition to be constructive since they benefit from the fighting match between Team Anna and the Government.
V. The Ideal political consciousness needed for Strong Lokpal:
There is sufficient political will by the Congress HC for enacting a weaker Lokpal bill ( as tabled in the winter session). However, more bolder and decisive political consciousness and incentive structure need to be evolved for any hope of instituting stronger/effective Lokpal. In order to materialize this realization the governing HCs need to realize that they have to consider Lokpal as a bitter life saving medication that they have to swallow for enduring health of their parties, rather than consider it as something that can put a bullet in their foot.
Although Anna’s team has been trying to convince Congress HC ( via ongoing pressure tactics) that it is in their long term self interest to enact strong Lokpal, it is clear now that the HC has not yet fully convinced. This reluctance may partly due to the political incentives/disincentives presented to them but ultimately the shameful lack of leadership skills and statesmanship in Congress’s core group deter this realization.
So what can be done?
Both IAC and Congress HC is better of working on amicable basis. Public confrontation weakens both IAC and government and possibly weakens IAC more than the government. IAC should intelligently design a strategy of carrots and sticks to deal with the government. So far its strategy only involved sticks. Ultimately, IAC has to credibly convince Congress HC that it can politically benefit from passing a strong bill (i.e govt can get credit for passing the bill,than Anna) . Threat of politically singling out Congress if they don’t bring strong bill is counterproductive for the movement especially if acted upon. At any cost, IAC will stay above confrontational politics and reduce possibilities for others(media) to blame the movement. IAC should be laser focused on keeping Lokpal an emotive issue, not political.
In this context, I suggest IAC to:
A. Understand the political dynamics and adjust expectation for having strong Lokpal.Focus IAC’s energy and media PR power on three or four specific doable items -low hanging fruits - for strengthening Lokpal. It should set aside big ticket items like complete independence of CBI or further independence of the Lokpal appointment mechanism. Rather, IAC is better of pressuring the government to bring back a few key powers previously granted in government’s earlier drafts but withdrawn in the bill tabled in the winter session and passed by Loksaba, such as:
- withdrawal of Lokpal’s suo motu power
- withdrawal of the power to choose and appoint Lokpal’s Prosecution and Investigation directors without government interference
- withdrawal of power of the police station for Lokpal
B. Create parallel private prosecutors. Organization like India Against Corruption (IAC) can set up NGOs to institutionalize the helpful role a private citizen like Subramanian Swamy (not endorsing any of his views or politics) is playing in the 2G case. In US, American Civil Liberty Union (ACLU) is a private organization staffed mainly by lawyers with the aim of protecting civil rights of the public through the court system. Similar organizations can be set up in India, filled with law professionals with prosecutor mindset (such as Bhushans), with the sole aim of delivering justice to corrupts. I believe IAC has grown enough in strength and resources to facilitate this type of NGOs across India.
